

INDEX TO AUTHORS

BASEMAN, KENNETH C.

with Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch.
Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and
Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in
Markets for Operating Systems Software. XL:265-315.

BAUMANN, MICHAEL G.

and Paul E. Godek. Could and Would Understood: Critical Elas-
ticities and the Merger Guidelines. XL:885-899.

BELDERBOS, RENÉ

and Peter Holmes. An Economic Analysis of *Matsushita* Revisited.
XL:825-857.

BLAIR, ROGER D.

The Ghost of *Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke Aktiengesellschaft*. XL:205-225.

and Amanda K. Esquibel. The *Microsoft* Muddle: A Caveat.
XL:257-264.

and Amanda K. Esquibel. Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging.
XL:371-396.

BRENNAN, TIMOTHY J.

Is the Theory Behind *U.S. v. AT&T* Applicable Today? XL:455-
482.

CORREIA, EDWARD O.

Antitrust and Liberalism. XL:99-168.

DEVLIN, ROSE ANNE

and Stylianos Perrakis. Legislating Competition in the Russian
Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. XL:901-927.

ECKARD, E. WOODROW

The Impact of the 1980's Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial
Concentration. XL:397-421.

ECONOMIDES, NICHOLAS

and Lawrence J. White. Access and Interconnection Pricing: How
Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?"
XL:557-579.

INDEX TO AUTHORS

- ESPOSITO, FRANCES FERGUSON
and Louis Esposito. Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap.
XL:433-453.
- ESPOSITO, LOUIS
see Esposito, Frances Ferguson
- ESQUIBEL, AMANDA K.
see Blair, Roger D.
- GABEL, DAVID
and David I. Rosenbaum. Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. XL:581-608.
- GANDAL, NEIL
and David J. Salant. Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. XL:699-712.
- GODEK, PAUL E.
see Baumann, Michael G.
- HAUSMAN, JERRY A.
and Timothy J. Tardiff. Efficient Local Exchange Competition.
XL:529-556.
- HAZLETT, THOMAS W.
Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. XL:609-644.
- HOLMES, PETER
see Belderbos, René
- KAHAI, SIMRAN K.
with David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. XL:645-666.
- KASERMAN, DAVID L.
see Kahai, Simran K.

INDEX TO AUTHORS

KLASS, MICHAEL W.

and Michael A. Salinger. Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? XL:667-698.

KOVACIC, WILLIAM E.

Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. XL:483-499.

LAINE, CHARLES R.

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer's Point of View. XL:423-432.

LOPATKA, JOHN E.

Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. XL:1-97.

and William H. Page. Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. XL:317-370.

MAYO, JOHN W.

see Kahai, Simran K.

NOLL, ROGER G.

The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. XL:501-528.

PAGE, WILLIAM H.

see Lopatka, John E.

PERRAKIS, STYLIANOS

see Devlin, Rose Anne

ROSENBAUM, DAVID I.

see Gabel, David

ROSS, STEPHEN F.

Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. XL:169-204.

SALANT, DAVID J.

see Gandal, Neil

INDEX TO AUTHORS

SALINGER, MICHAEL A.

see Klass, Michael W.

SHEPHERD, GEORGE B.

Overlap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom.
XL:859-884.

STEVENS, DALLAL

Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case
of Brazil. XL:929-971.

TARDIFF, TIMOTHY J.

see Hausman, Jerry A.

TRAVERS, ARTHUR H.

Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. XL:779-824.

WARREN-BOULTON, FREDERICK R.

see Baseman, Kenneth C.

WHITE, LAWRENCE J.

see Economides, Nicholas

WILCOX, THOMAS C.

Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It's Time to Revise
the Vertical Merger Guidelines. XL:227-256.

WISE, MICHAEL O.

Antitrust's Newest "New Learning" Returns the Law to Its Roots:
Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Pol-
icy. XL:713-777.

WOROCH, GLENN A.

see Baseman, Kenneth C.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It's Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines. Thomas C. Willcox. XL:227-256.

BREYER, STEPHEN

Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. John E. Lopatka. XL:1-97.

Antitrust and Liberalism. Edward O. Correia. XL:99-168.

Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. Stephen F. Ross. XL:169-204.

The Ghost of Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft. Roger D. Blair. XL:205-225.

CARTELS

Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap. Frances Ferguson Esposito and Louis Esposito. XL:433-453.

Overlap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom. George B. Shepherd. XL:859-884.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY

Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. Arthur H. Travers. XL:779-824.

COMPETITION

The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:257-264.

Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating Systems Software. Kenneth C. Baseman, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch. XL:265-315.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. John E. Lopatka and William H. Page. XL:317-370.

Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:371-396.

Efficient Local Exchange Competition. Jerry A. Hausman and Timothy J. Tardiff. XL:529-556.

Legislating Competition in the Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. Rose Anne Devlin and Stylianos Perrakis. XL:901-927.

Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil. Dallal Stevens. XL:929-971.

CONSENT DECREES

Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? Michael W. Klass and Michael A. Salinger. XL:667-698.

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. Neil Gandal and David J. Salant. XL:699-712.

ECONOMICS

General

Antitrust's Newest "New Learning" Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Policy. Michael O. Wise. XL:713-777.

Market Structure

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer's Point of View. Charles R. Laine. XL:423-432.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today? Timothy J. Brennan. XL:455-482.

The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. Roger G. Noll. XL:501-528.

"EFFICIENT COMPONENT PRICING RULE"

Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?" Nicholas Economides and Lawrence J. White. XL:557-579.

FOREIGN ANTITRUST LAWS

Brazil

Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil. Dallal Stevens. XL:929-971.

Russian Federation

Legislating Competition in the Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. Rose Anne Devlin and Stylianos Perrakis. XL:901-927.

FUTURE OF ANTITRUST

Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. John E. Lopatka. XL:1-97.

Antitrust and Liberalism. Edward O. Correia. XL:99-168.

Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. Stephen F. Ross. XL:169-204.

The Ghost of Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft. Roger D. Blair. XL:205-225.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer's Point of View. Charles R. Laine. XL:423-432.

INDUSTRY STUDIES

Computer Software

The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:257-264.

Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating Systems Software. Kenneth C. Baseman, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch. XL:265-315.

Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. John E. Lopatka and William H. Page. XL:317-370.

Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:371-396.

Manufacturing

The Impact of the 1980's Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration. E. Woodrow Eckard. XL:397-421.

Telecommunications

Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today? Timothy J. Brennan. XL:455-482.

Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. William E. Kovacic. XL:483-499.

The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. Roger G. Noll. XL:501-528.

Efficient Local Exchange Competition. Jerry A. Hausman and Timothy J. Tardiff. XL:529-556.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule?" Nicholas Economides and Lawrence J. White. XL:557-579.

Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. David Gabel and David I. Rosenbaum. XL:581-608.

Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. Thomas W. Hazlett. XL:609-644.

Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. XL:645-666.

Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? Michael W. Klass and Michael A. Salinger. XL:667-698.

Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. Neil Gandal and David J. Salant. XL:699-712.

LANDMARK CASES

An Economic Analysis of Matsushita Revisited. René Belderbos and Peter Holmes. XL:825-857.

MARKET DEFINITION

Could and Would Understood: Critical Elasticities and the Merger Guidelines. Michael G. Baumann and Paul E. Godek. XL:885-899.

MERGERS

Horizontal

The Impact of the 1980's Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration. E. Woodrow Eckard. XL:397-421.

Vertical

Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It's Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines. Thomas C. Willcox. XL:227-256.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

OVERLAP

Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap. Frances Ferguson Esposito and Louis Esposito. XL:433-453.

Overlap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom. George B. Shepherd. XL:859-884.

PREDATORY PRICING

Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. David Gabel and David I. Rosenbaum. XL:581-608.

Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. Thomas W. Hazlett. XL:609-644.

Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. XL:645-666.

An Economic Analysis of Matsushita Revisited. René Belderbos and Peter Holmes. XL:825-857.

REGULATION

Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. William E. Kovacic. XL:483-499.

ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. Arthur H. Travers. XL:779-824.

THEORY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Antitrust's Newest "New Learning" Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Policy. Michael O. Wise. XL:713-777.

INDEX TO SUBJECTS

Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. Arthur H. Travers.
XL:779-824.